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Abstract

logic of consequence) and institutional (logic of
appropriateness) decision-making logics [5]. In the
public sector, these AI adoptions are mostly studied
looking at the legal and normative transformations
they trigger, however the impacts these
transformations have on the accountability of the
action of the PA is mostly undermined. To shed light
on this crucial aspect related to the adoption of AI in
the public sector the paper addresses the following
research question:
RQ: what is the accountability of AI supported
decision-making process in the public sector?
To answer this question the paper builds on the
theory of assemblages [6]. The theory helps to unfold
the intertwined nature of AI systems and organization
and legal actions which ultimately determine the
accountability of the actions of public sector
organizations.

Public sector organizations literature has
addressed the influence of AI on decision-making
process, looking mainly at rationalization and
efficiency. However, recent adoptions of AI have been
challenged because of their discriminatory nature. As
a result, questions emerged on the accountability of AI
supported decision-making processes in the public
sector. This research sheds light on how AI transforms
decision-making processes in the public sector and
hence on their accountability. The paper illustrates
that AI adoptions lead to the emergency of technolegal entanglements – assemblages – which might
impact upon AI accountability. Building on the
findings of some of the most controversial and
discussed cases of AI adoption in the public sector –
COMPAS in the US and UKVI in the UK – the paper
makes the case for a new approach to AI supported
public sector decision-making accountability.

1. Introduction
Public sector organizations adopt Artificial
Intelligence (AI) systems to improve the efficiency of
the provision of public services [1]. The Public
Administration (PA) has deployed AI tools in order to
reach better informed and more rapid decision-making
in multiple service domains: from policing to home
office, from criminal justice to healthcare. AI in fact
formalises decision-making processes rationalising
the decision-making tree in the algorithmic code.
Hence, AI reduces administrative discretionary [2]
explicating formal and informal rules into the script of
the technology [3]. Accordingly, AI encodes into the
scripts of the algorithm formal and informal
organisation processes which create a new
technological accountability which supersedes formal
and informal mechanisms of accountability. Decisions
taken by AI algorithms follow the logic designed into
the script of the technology, which imposes a
technological order [4] that transcends rational (the
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2. Background
Artificial Intelligence adoptions in the public
sector are not equally researched as those in the private
sector [7]. However, scholars have investigated the
topic and found that AI systems can benefit public
service provision: Wirtz et al. [8] offer a
comprehensive review of the most recent researches in
this domain.
A robust stream of literature accounts for how AI
reduces the red tape and improves the efficiency of the
administrative procedures [9]. AI favours cost savings
and better resource allocation [10]. AI systems have
been successfully adopted in different domains of the
public sector to support service provisions and to
rationalise administrative tasks [1, 11]. Despite these
positive and encouraging outcomes, obstacles and
challenges are also identified as direct consequence of
AI adoptions in public sector. Overall, scholars
accounted for potential problems related to AI
governance [12]; from AI ethical standards [13]; to
AI’s socially acceptance and trust [14]. Despite the
attention given to the relationships between ICT and
the formalisation of public organisation practices and
processes in literature [15, 16], the how AI impacts
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these formalisations and the associated decisionmaking processes has not been extensively researched
yet. In this paper we first discuss how AI algorithms
operate and their impact on decisions taken in the PA.
Hence, we question their impacts on PA decisionmaking accountability. Recent publications have
addressed the problem of AI accountability looking at
auditing [17] and algorithmic explainability [18].
While insightful, these contributions do not help
shedding light on why AI might challenge the
accountability of public sector decision-making
processes.
Given the space limits imposed by this submission,
we cannot enter in an in-depth discussion of the
complex concept of accountability. For the research
purpose, we rely on Bovens’ [19] definition of
accountability as a “mechanism that involves an
obligation to explain and justify an actor conduct” to
those who can scrutinize and judge the actor’s conduct
and order sanctions. Formal and informal mechanisms
of accountability can be identified [19]. Given the
focus (and the space limitations) of this research, and
the fact that informal mechanisms of accountability do
not fully capture the formalisations imposed by ICT
systems [20], we will focus on formal mechanisms of
accountability. Hence, we investigate and question the
accountability of the techno-legal mechanisms that
result from the negotiation between formal, legal
mechanisms of accountability with AI systems.
The increased concerns with regards to the
discriminating effects of PA decisions mediated by AI
systems [1] raises the call to question AI
accountability i.e. to explain and justify how AI
impacts PA decisions. The lack of accountability of AI
decision-making systems have raised concerns on the
use of AI to support public sector service delivery [21].
These concerns mainly deal with ethical and legal
aspects [22].
The search for AI accountability in this context has
been framed as a human/technology control dilemma
[8]: humans are not accountable since they are not in
full control of AI [23]; or humans are accountable for
the technology despite their control over AI [24].
Alternatively, many scholars have focused on
transparency as crucial determinant of AI
accountability. Hence, scholars focus on technological
transparency, i.e. the need to open the “black box”
involving decision-making based on AI systems [25],
others call for the introduction of designers’
“explanation” as reliable practice to improve the
algorithmic transparency [18, 26].
Building on this background, this paper aims to
make a step further to explain and justify, hence
question the accountability of decision-making
processes supported by AI in the public sector. We

argue that to fully unpack the accountability of AIbased decision-making process, it is important to shed
light on the complex effects of AI systems on the
decision-making logics followed by public sector
organisations. This research shows that technology is
not a neutral tool of transformation: rather, technology
reflects but also transcend decision-making drivers of
the context where it is deployed [27]. Accordingly, AI
systems adopted to support decision-making processes
in the PA generate organizational, legal, and
institutional, transformations that deeply impact on the
logics driving public decision-making and hence on
services production and delivery[6, 28].

3. How technology shapes and transforms
practices: functional simplification and
closure
The literature that analyses how technology
engrains and transforms social and institutional
practices into the code of technology [29, 30] is very
valuable to understand and depict how the socioinstitutional transformations engendered by AI
adoptions in the public sector impact on the
accountability of the decision-making processes. This
literature does not specifically study AI but offers an
in-depth account of how information and
communication technology (ICT) works and impacts
on organization practices, which very well applies to
AI. Rooted in Luhmann’s [31] work on technology,
this literature challenges the widespread assumption
that understanding ICT is a matter of means and ends
[29], and sheds light on the specific trajectories by
which ICT transforms existing relations in the contexts
of its application.
ICT has properties that structure the causal
connections between the organizational practices,
processes and activities it mediates [29, 31]. ICT remaps the organizational procedures and practices it
mediates [31] in the predefined logical sequences of
actions [32] unique of the code that structures the
functioning of each specific software application. By
so doing, ICT constructs into the software
functionalities sets of structured sequences and
interdependences that standardise the execution of
organizational procedures and processes. The effect is
that ICT imposes regulatory frameworks that frame
organizational activities, providing stable and
standardized means of interaction and coordination
[29]. These regulatory frameworks are shaped into the
technical functionalities of the systems. Work
sequences and flows are embedded into the
technological functions, reducing the procedural
complexity of the work in causal or instrumental
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relations that are standardized and stabilized in the
technical scripts. This happens as the result of the
processes of functional simplification and closure [33,
29]. These are the processes by which ICT engrains
organization’s activities, procedures, or operations
into its codes. The code that governs the functions of
an ICT system has specific functional requirements
that only allow to design activities, processes, or
operations to be executed in specific ways [29].
Whenever a public administration designs and deploys
an ICT solution in an organizational context, the
normative, institutional, and legal logics governing the
action of the organization have to be re-written into the
code of the ICT. In other words, as explained by
Lanzara [6], institutional codes which regulate the
functioning of an existing organization are reframed to
accommodate the unique code of the chosen ICT
system. Moreover, the complexity of all the
normative, legal, behavioural and social values that
shape the causal connections that determine how an
organization works cannot be fully accommodated in
the design of an ICT solution. It is not possible to
rewrite and translate all these causal connections into
the scripts of ICT systems. These casual connections
have to be reduced – or, functionally simplified: the
language of automation needs to enclose the
composite of procedures, actions and relations in
standardized and replicable logical sequences [29]
which govern the function of the ICT system. In order
to successfully replicate the practices reduced into the
code of the ICT, the causal connections already
simplified need to be functionally closed. That is, the
reduction of complexity needs to be isolated from the
external context, in order to avoid possible
interference from social actors and execution. While
functional simplification is obtained through the
reconstruction of existing relations in instrumental set
of actions [29], functional closure refers to the
application of a “protective cocoon” which safeguards
the causal connections reduced and allows their
replicability over time [29, p.192].
Functional simplification and closure guarantee
that ICT reproduces its standards and executes its
functions consistently in different contexts of
application. Though, the normative, legal, behavioural
and social values that are functionally simplified and
closed in the ICT change their features for ever. They
lose their original characteristics because functional
simplification and closure rewrite them in new,
stabilised sequences of causal interdependences that
make them very difficult to be changed [29]. These
sequences of causal interdependences, structured in
the code of the ICT, have the ability and the power to
redesign organizational processes and procedures.
Hence, ICT creates new paths of interdependences that

produce new sets of regulations in the contexts of their
application [30]. Therefore, every time ICT systems
are deployed to support decision-making processes,
they replicate and reproduce the functionally
simplified and closed patterns over time [30]. The
more the decision-making processes are digitised, the
more they get standardised into stable causal and
instrumental relations [33], which make them very
difficult to modify. By so doing, ICT becomes a
regulative regime [34]: it incorporates and reproduces
practices and actions in its codes, which carry the
power and the authority to regulate how organization’s
decision-making processes are structured.

4. The creation of assemblages
Functional simplification and closure describe the
way by which institutional bodies and norms are
transformed (and reduced) in ICT standard. Therefore,
the deployment of ICT in public sector organizations
produces relevant institutional transformations beyond
[6, 30] the impact on rationalisation and effectiveness.
In order to better account for the different impacts
of ICT on public sector decision-making processes, it
is valuable to consider that to deploy ICTs in complex
organizations means to juxtapose a single regulative
regime – the one carried by ICT – with other regulative
regimes such as normative, legal, institutional and
cultural, that constrain how the organization take
decisions [34]. ICT adoptions occur either in
coordination or collision with other regulative
regimes, such as those imposed by normative
prescriptions, legal codes, bureaucratic logics, cultural
and social systems of values. However, once ICT is
deployed it has to negotiate with the other regulative
regimes – normative, legal, institutional and cultural –
that already regulate how the organization takes
decisions. The impact of ICT on organization
decision-making is therefore the outcome of the
negotiation of the regulative regime carried by ICT
with others which already shape organization
decision-making processes. This negotiation is
complex and time-consuming, but it is important to
fully appreciate how ICT impacts and transforms
public sector organizations and the way in which these
organizations take decisions.
In order to adequately assess how the negotiations
between the regulative regime of ICT and the other
regulative regimes occur, we have to clearly identify
the mechanisms which shape these negotiations.
Contini and Cordella [35] observe that the different
regulative regimes do not mix or simply overlap: they
maintain a degree of autonomy when they encounter
in a specific context.
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To better understand how different regimes
negotiate the way in which the organizations take
decisions we have to investigate how the different
configurations carried by the regimes overlap,
interconnect, clash or intertwine. To explain these
negotiations, Lanzara [6] provides the useful concept
of “assemblages”. Assemblages are the product of
multiple determinations that are not reducible to a
single logic: functional linkages and other public
sector practices and actions equally count in working
out new institutional ecology. According to Lanzara
[6], an assemblage is a particular institutional
configuration, generated by the negotiation of ICT
with existing normative, legal, institutional and
cultural arrangements. Every time an ICT is deployed
in a public sector organization with the aim to achieve
a specific objective, it engages with existing
normative, legal, institutional and cultural
arrangements which already govern how the
organization works. The arrangements are regulated
by norms, laws and behaviours which structure the
administrative activity and define boundaries of
operations. Once ICT is deployed within a specific
context, it doesn’t impact on an unregulated context.
ICT layers on existing regimes which already regulate
the organization decision-making processes [6].
The negotiation among the different regimes
produces techno-legal-institutional assemblages that
are by nature loosely structures [6]. The compatibility
of the different regimes is limited and complicated,
because the different regimes carry different logics,
patterns and systems of values [6, 32]. The
negotiations among these regimes involve multiple
dimensions and trajectories that are difficult to
intergrade and that are not necessarily compatible [6].
This further explains why the adoptions of ICTs in the
public sector are challenging, difficult to be managed,
and why the outcomes of the transformations they
facilitate are also difficult to predict and control [36].
To unfold the impacts of AI on public sector
decision-making process, and on the production and
delivery of public services, is therefore important to
analyse (a) how AI functionally simplifies and closes
organization practices and (b) how the negotiation
between the regulative regime carried by AI and those
already present in the public organization unfolds.

5. AI: functional simplification and
closure
Artificial intelligence provides new means to
analyse and process information [37] which transform
the way in which public sector organizations produce
and provide services [8, 1]. Artificial intelligence
relies on algorithmic data processing. Algorithms

structure problem solving in formalised and predefined rules to be implemented in step by step
computational operations [38]. The use of AI in public
sector organizations is therefore associated with
transformations in data processing that follow the
predefined rules formalised in step by step
computational operations which constitute the kernel
of the algorithmic functions at the core of the AI
system. The formalisation of organization processes
offers univocal means to execute them, which
facilitates and leads the automations of organization
decision-making processes. The structured rules that
predefine how data processing is executed allow to
delegate the execution of organization decisions to the
AI system – i.e. this result in the automation of
organization processes. The automation of
organization processes redefines fundamental
organization practices, delegating the execution of
tasks that were previously under the responsibility of
organization actors, to the AI algorithms [39]. The
automation of organization tasks brought by the
adoption of AI systems also reshapes the distribution
of control and authority within and among
organization functions. The responsibility and
accountability of organization tasks are not any more
exclusively under the traditional organizations’
functions and people in charge of it, but rather in the
structure of the algorithm that now executes these
tasks [7]. The rules that govern the fractioning of the
algorithms at the core of the AI system captivate
organization decision-making processes. These rules
delegate organizations’ decision responsibilities and
accountability [40] to technological artefacts that
enforce pattern of action that are unique, and not
necessarily compatible with the contextual normative,
administrative and legal governing logics.

6. AI: the assemblage
AI redesigns organizations’ decision-making rules
and regulations into the functional sequences and
interdependences proper of the algorithm. By doing
so, it follows the design principle specific of the
chosen technology, which can diverge from the
trajectory proper of the specific organization’s
decision-making rules and regulations [7, 6]. The
tension that emerges between the different decisionmaking logics governing the functioning of the AI
algorithms and of the organization rules and
regulations has implications that are unique given the
normative and regulatory nature of public sector
organizations. The formalisation of the computational
mechanisms that govern the decision-making logic of
the AI transforms how the public administration takes
decisions, which has impacts on how public services
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are produced and provided. Public sector
organizations have in fact a unique and very specific
role: to enable policies that have been selected by
elected leaders [41]. Public sector organizations
offices should deploy these policies and thus deliver
public services taking decisions that follow the
specific prescriptions of the policies. To effectively
follow these prescriptions, public sector decisionmaking processes are organized and regulated on the
base of well-defined normative and legal principles.
Normative and legal principles provide a frame of
action that guarantee effective and coherent decisionmaking processes. Inscribing normative and legal
values into the algorithmic formalizations of AI
embeds intrinsic transformations in the decisionmaking process of public sector organizations [3]. AI
supported public sector decisions are defined by the
structured predefined computational sequences proper
of the algorithm, rather than by the normative and legal
framework that govern the driving policy. Changing
the process by which decisions are taken directly
impacts the values the services generate [42].
Thus, the contribution of AI systems to public
sector decision-making must be assessed considering
the profound transformation they have on the
organization’s procedures which govern the public
sector decisions [43]. Whenever AI is adopted to
sustain the decision-making process in the public
sector, such transformations cannot be neglected to
evaluate the outcomes of the decision-making and the
consequences it has on public services. Accordingly,
responsibility and accountability need to be
adequately assessed and evaluated against this
background.

7. Methodology
In order to illustrate our argument, we discuss two
different examples of AI adoption in the public sector.
We rely on the exploratory case study approach [44,
45], using secondary data to understand how the
algorithm at the core of the functioning of the AI
negotiated its functioning with existing norms and
laws governing the decision-making processes of the
public administration. Exploratory case study
approach is relevant to investigate contexts where
there aren’t clear and single set of outcomes [44].
Through the selected cases, we aim to demonstrate that
assemblages the emerge from AI adoptions call for a
more nuanced understanding of the accountability of
AI supported decision-making processes in the public
sector. The examples under investigation rely on
different AI adoptions to support decision-making
processes in the public sector. Data collection includes

secondary sources, mainly governmental documents,
Parliamentary inquiries and media releases.
For each case, data collection was undertaken in
order to identify the main aspects of each single case
study prior to the definition of the research question
and hypotheses. Following the exploratory case study
approach, the research question was formulated after
the data were collected. On the basis of qualitative data
analysis and collection, we were able to formulate our
research interest, which has turned out to be an
explanation of the impact the algorithm at the core of
an AI system has on public sector decision-making
accountability. Case study research is the most
suitable approach for examining a phenomenon in its
natural settings [45] and therefore the ideal vehicle for
gaining a deeper understanding of the political, social,
and technical factors that influence the accountability
of AI supported decision-making processes in the
public sector.

8. Cases
8.1 UKVI: Speedy boarding for white people?
Since 2015, Home Office UK Visas and
Immigration (UKVI) adopted an AI algorithm to
sustain the decision-making process in the VISA
applications service. The AI is used to streamline
applications: it assigned a different colour to
applications in relation to the applicant’s perceived
risk rating. Green (low risk), Amber (medium risk)
and Red (high risk). The AI predicts applicants’ risk
on the basis of criteria such as nationality, ethnicity
and age. Once assessed, applications are sent to
caseworkers who further scrutinize the files and take
the final decision. The AI system has a relevant impact
on application processing time, and most important on
the application’s chances to be approved: figures show
that 96.36% of Green applications are accepted. In
contrast, 81.08% of Amber applications and to 48.59%
of Red applications are granted a VISA. In other
words, less than one application out of two, if labelled
Red, is granted a VISA [46]. The streamlining activity
which assigned a Green, Amber or Red tag to the
VISA applications has an impact on the organization
of the whole decision-making process. The AI
algorithm increased the productivity of the offices
which led managers to set a daily target: officials are
supposed to produce 75 decisions on Green, 35 on
Amber and 25 on Red applications a day. The official
report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders
and Immigrations defined these targets “challenging”,
and the report emphasized that due to the high
expected productivity, officials often relied on the AI
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algorithm classification without a proper review on the
decisions adopted [46].
Civil society organizations, political forces and
media shed a light on the algorithmic assessment
process, claiming that it was perpetrating
discriminations [47, 48]. Moreover, the report [46]
revealed that “(a) tool that streams applications into
Green, Amber, Red clusters carries the risk of
‘confirmation bias’” (p.19). In other words, the system
perpetrated existing biases related to nationality and
hence ethnic. NGOs critics to the policy claimed that
the outcome of this procedure was to create a
“Fastlane” for white people, while BAME groups had
less chances to see their applications approved [49].
The case became subject of a parliamentary debate,
where the UK government rejected accusations of
racism, stating that system worked in line with
prescriptions from the Equalities Act of 2010 [50]. In
particular, the Home Office said that the algorithm is
used exclusively to streamline applications, and that
the final decision is taken by human officials. The
purpose of the algorithm is to increase efficiency,
saving time and cutting costs in the whole procedure.
NGOs and opposition parties asked the government to
disclose additional information related to the
algorithm logic and functioning [48]. As of January
2020, the government opposed to reveal the algorithm
functioning details, such as the factors and the weights
that determine the potential risk, or the updating of the
algorithm itself [47]. Most recent data show that as of
June 2019, UKVI rejected circa 400.000 applications
out of 3.3 million received.

8.2 State v Loomis
In 2013, US citizen Eric Loomis was arrested in
Wisconsin for driving a car involved in a former
shooting case. Loomis pleaded guilty and was
accordingly sentenced six years of detention.
However, the sentence was not exclusively based on
the judge’s evaluation of Loomis’ criminal record: a
specific AI system produced a score which expressed
Loomis’ potentiality to re-offend. The judge did not
decide the sentence exclusively on the score, but they
took into account the input produced by the AI system.
The software, called COMPAS (Correctional offender
management profiling for alternative sanctions), was
based on an algorithm developed by business company
Northpoint (now Equivant). The algorithm was able to
predict the possibility to re-offend of a single citizen,
on the basis of historical data and the answers to a
questionnaire [51]. Loomis was assessed as an
individual with high-risk to re-offend. What is relevant
in this case is how the algorithm worked: it did not
assess Loomis’ individual recidivist, rather, the

algorithm elaborated the prediction on the basis of a
comparison between Loomis’ data and a group of
individuals with similar characteristics [52].
Loomis challenged the sentence, claiming that the
algorithm-based software was a clear violation of the
right to due process [53]. In particular, Loomis’ case
highlighted that (a) the algorithm was biased because
it utilized information such as gender and race, (b) the
algorithm used to predict Loomis’ recidivism by
aggregating data on “recidivism risk for groups similar
to the offender” [52], (c) that the use of COMPAS did
not allow the defendant to access algorithm details. In
other words, Loomis challenged the validity and
accuracy of a system which sentenced citizens on the
basis of an algorithm which could not be accessed by
the defendant because it was protected by property
rights and patents.
The case was submitted to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, which rejected the defendant claims, pointing
out that (a) the risk assessment procedure was mostly
correct, (b) the score was only one of the factors taken
into consideration by the judge to formulate the
sentence, (c) that Loomis could have access to the
criteria used by COMPAS, but not on the algorithm
mechanisms because they were covered by property
rights [54]. However, the Court recommended a
careful use of AI-based tools in sentencing: as Justice
Roggensack’s concurring opinion demonstrated,
judges are entitled to “consider” AI-based
information, not to “rely” on them to formulate
sentences [54].
However, this collides with the US Supreme Court
(i.e. Townsend v Burke) ruling which recognized that
the due process right to a fair sentencing procedure
included “the right to be sentenced on the basis of
accurate information”. To this end, the Court in State
v Skaff went on to underscore that a defendant must
be given “means” to investigate and verify the
information. This rises a fundamental question: how
can the information produced by an AI system be
investigated and verified? Hence, how can the AI be
used to support courts’ rulings in the US?

9. Discussion
The selected examples offer the opportunity to
analyze how AI shapes decision-making in the public
sector. Despite their differences, the examples offer
relevant insights on the way AI systems work and
impact on decision-making processes underpinning
public service provision.
The cases show that the choice to implement an AI
system to profile individuals on the basis of preset
criteria designed in the algorithm produces inputs for
the decision-making process that distort the outcome
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of the decisions. These inputs are in fact not neutral:
rather, they carry values that reflect the way in which
AI systems functionally simplify and close the data.
To match the needs of the algorithm, data about
individuals (immigrants, asylum seekers, convicted
felon) are fetched from different databases. In the case
of UK from databases which contain information
about known patterns in immigration abuses per age
or nationality, etc. [46]; in the case of USA from police
records, residential records, employment records, etc.
[51]. The data sets fetched from the different databases
are weighted to determine different risks associated
with a profile. The weighting of the variable in the
algorithm is defined by its design and the logical
constraints of the chosen scripts at the core of the AI
system [55]. Moreover, the AI profiling algorithm
combines data owned by different agencies. These
data are structured following the specific needs of each
agency, regardless on whether the data belong to a
convicted felon or and immigrant applying for a VISA.
The logic which functionally simplified and closed the
original data sets (which reflect the needs of the single
agency for which the data were initially produced) is
neglected when the data are weighted in the algorithm
used to predict the level of risk the individual might
create for the UK or US authorities. Moreover, the AI
algorithm has functions which define unique data
patterns which univocally determine how the data are
combined and used [55]. The weighting of the
different data and the definition of the patterns among
data are also functionally simplified and closed data
sets and data relations [56]. The weighting produces
sets of causal connections that structure the outcomes
of data interactions and processing and hence the
profiling of the individual.
For example, in COMPAS the Violent Recidivism
Risk Scale is calculated as follows [57]:
s=a(-w)+afirst(-w)+hviolencew+v edu w+h nc w,
where s is the violent recidivism risk score, w is a
weight multiplier, a is current age, afirst is the age at
first arrest, hviolence is the history of violence, vedu
is vocation education level, and hnc is the history of
noncompliance. The weight w is “determined by the
strength of the item’s relationship to person offense
recidivism” [57].
Since the UK government refuses to give any
details of the factors and relationships used to
determine the risk it is not possible to provide a
snapshot of how risk is calculated in UKVI case.
However, we know that nationality, residence,
academic qualification, language proficiency,
financial situation, and age are among key criteria used
by the algorithm to process applications.
In both cases, data are de-contextualized from the
relevant context, and the attributes which define an

individual’s profile are abstracted from the context
where they were produced and fragmented into
independent data units – such as data cells in the
database. As the examples show, the AI systems
design in their code a set of new data linkages and
relations which abstract individuals’ background and
history to accommodate the logic of the algorithm. The
AI algorithm constructs a unique profile of the
individuals designed in the pattern of relationships that
are constructed in the code of the algorithm which
does not necessary reflect the real profile of the single
person. In the UK or USA cases the risk identified by
the algorithm is not the individual risk but the output
of the data relationships constructed in the algorithm.
The algorithm provides univocal ways to infer how
different individual characteristics such as gender,
age, nationality, combine to determine the social risk.
The action of reducing causal connections is
noteworthy necessary: without this action, the
algorithm would not be able to work and produce the
profiling. Also, to be effective, the set of causal
connections must be isolated from the external context
and made stable over time; hence it has to be
functionally closed. Therefore, the process by which
the AI profiling tool reconstructs the individual’s
history is “cocooned” into the script of the algorithm.
The procedure by which the AI processes the data
stored in different databases is engrained in the script
of the technology and cannot be modified if not
following a formal complex technical procedure [58].
Profiling the individuals following the script of the
algorithm changes the underline rules of the decisionmaking process. As the selected cases show, the
profiling follows the logic of the script and not
necessarily those prescribed by the law or by the
human-based procedure. Indeed, all projects were
criticized because the profiling failed to adhere to the
existing legal and administrative framework. When
the algorithm functionally simplifies data relationships
and data interdependences, it creates a new
assemblage where the regulatory regime of the law is
intertwined with regulatory regime of the technology.
In other words, the decisions on VISA streamlining
and on justice sentencing are negotiated between the
regulatory regimes of the law and of the technology.
The cases reveal that the outcome of the decisionmaking process impacted by AI systems is different
from the decision-making made by a human agent. In
fact, the algorithm does not assess the data that belong
to a single person in the light of individual
characteristics and experiences; rather, it elaborates
the outcome of a preset collective experience
reconstructed according to technological standards.
The results are indeed difficult to connect to the
backgrounds of the individuals that are profiled. As a
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consequence, the AI prediction of an individual to be
harmful for the British or American society depends
on the outputs of a profiling tool which works on the
basis of a world which is reconstructed by functional
simplification and closure made by the AI algorithm.
Those who have to take the final decision will only
have access to data that are decontextualized. Hence,
they will not be able to assess the individual case. The
human-mediated final decision-making process
emerges as a new assemblage where decision makers
take decisions using abstract data and data combined
by the AI, instead of relying on individual data and
circumstances as prescribed by legal norms and rules.
Building on these findings, we aim to critically
evaluate the concept of accountability when it relates
to AI-based decision-making. The two selected cases
show that the outcome of the decision-making process
informed by AI has been formally challenged. The UK
government rejected allegations of discriminating
practices related to AI, and so did the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Interestingly, public institutions built
their counter-argument on the basis of two
considerations: (a) the algorithm had an ancillary role
to the decision-making, and the public sector final
decision relied on the human evaluation and (b) it was
denied the right to access algorithms used to support
decision-making.
With respect to the first point, public institutions
claimed that the decision-making process is made of
two functions, automation and human evaluation.
These two functions are not only separated, but reflect
a hierarchical difference, because the human
evaluation might overrule the information produced
by AI. However, since the mechanisms that govern the
functioning of the algorithm are not made public and
transparent, the decision makers cannot know how and
why a specific profiling is made. They have to take
decisions using inputs different than those they had to
rely upon had the AI system not been in place. The AI
systems make recommendations using patterns that
are not known to the decisions makers. In both cases,
the decision makers have to judge and justify if they
do not follow the AI recommendations, but not if they
agree with it.
For instance, in the UKVI case, public managers in
charge of the final decisions on VISA are not expected
to review a decision which was in line with the
streaming rating [46]. In other words, Green
applications approved, and Red applications rejected
remained undisputed. When asked about possible
allocating errors by the AI algorithm, public managers
showed confidence on the accuracy of the algorithm
streaming rating [46] even if they, as well as the
public, are not given any access or explanation on how
the algorithm works. Hence, the human decision

makers’ actions are constrained by the functions
executed by AI algorithm. Decision makers receive
black boxed inputs to structure their decision-making.
Even if the final decision is not taken by the AI, the AI
produces key inputs for the decision makers that are
by nature undisputable. The functional simplification
and closure and the algorithmic interdepended create
assemblages that are very difficult if not impossible to
untangle [56].
Therefore, when it comes to accountability, we
posit that to fully understand who is accountable for
decisions that rely on inputs generated by AI systems,
we have to consider the whole assemblage, where
responsibilities are shared by the technology and by
humans. Although valuables, contributions that
underline that human agents should take full
responsibility for the machines [59: pp. 19-20] do not
capture the profound transformative power that AI
holds and deploys whenever adopted in a decisionmaking process, even if only to assist the decision
makers. Responsibility is not exclusive: it is shared,
precisely because of the nature of assemblages created
by the adoption of technology. The structuration of
assemblages blurs the boundaries of accountability,
because the negotiation between existing regimes
reshapes the decision-making process: technology and
humans activities intertwin in a new entanglement that
has to be adequately accounted. Accordingly, it is
necessary to evaluate the entire process with all the
inputs that might come from technology and humans,
and make the new process accountable as a whole.
With respect to the second point – the fact that
public sources often deny the access to algorithms
details – we do not neglect the relevance of property
rights and patents. However, if the public sector
decides to rely on private firms’ consultancy to
elaborate algorithms which might serve in public
sector decision-making, we do believe that the public
sector has additional duties of accountability to the
citizens. On this point, some scholars have advanced
possible solutions in order to provide the best possible
transparency without releasing algorithms’ details [51,
26]. Although valuable, these contributions do not
completely capture the profound transformations that
AI produces in the decision-making process. Through
this paper, we have investigated cases where the
outcome of the AI supported decision-making had a
severe impact on citizens’ life. Given the increasing
relevance of the AI impact on public service provision,
there is a need for a better understanding of the
consequences of AI adoption to inform public sector
decision-making processes. To this purpose, and
following many public bodies and institutions already
claiming for it [46, 59], we believe that opening the
algorithm, and exposing to the public scrutiny the
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steps of the decision-making AI supports will be a
substantial action towards a better accountability. The
light shall be directed on the accountability of the
assemblage constituted by technological, institutional
and legal dimension and not independently on each
dimension.

10. Conclusions
AI in public sector organizations is often deployed
to achieve the objectives of rationalization and
efficiency. However, given the increasing diffusion of
AI tools, public managers should better consider the
multidimensional impact of AI on the normative and
legal
frameworks
which
underpin
public
administration decision-making processes. Through
this research, we shed light on the impact of AI on the
decision-making processes in the public sector. The
cases of UKVI and State v Loomis offer interesting
insights on the impacts of the adoption of AI on the
accountability of public sector organizations decisionmaking. AI functionally simplifies and closes
administrative processes. As a consequence, AI has
impacts that transform the logic underlining the
decision-making processes. The cases show that AI
profiles in a way which is quite different from what is
prescribed by legal and normative frameworks. Hence,
AI can produce outcomes which do not reflect relevant
factual circumstances. When these outcomes are used
as inputs to support public sector decision-making,
issues of accountability arise. As the examples show,
institutions denied allegations of discriminations
regarding the algorithms. At the same time, a request
for further disclosure of algorithms’ details has been
turned down. Algorithms can be seen as powerful
carrier of modernization in public organizations:
however, their capacity to create value has to be
closely scrutinized. To this purpose, the research
reveals that unpacking how algorithms work is needed
to adequately understand the impact AI has on the
accountability of public sector decision-making.
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